After seven years in Bitcoin, I have never been more confident that this network is now absolutely unstoppable. Nothing short of an extinction level event can stop Bitcoin from slowly but surely growing as a global, agnostic, alternative network for storing and transferring value.
Back in 2013 when the entire market cap hit $1 Billion for the first time, it was really scary to put a considerable amount of money in BTC. You might like Bitcoin and find it interesting but doubt would still creep up in your mind about its staying power and the fact that one bug could bring it all down. Mt. Gox got hacked, 800,000 BTC stolen, it crashed from $1200 to $190 by 2015, so how do you even believe that 5 years later it would be a sustained $200+ billion market? Yet here we are. As long as the Bitcoin blockchain is churning out new blocks of unstoppable transactions, that's all that matters. Naysayers don't understand that this is all Bitcoin needs to do: Churn out new blocks every ten minutes. And with every new block, a monumental amount of energy and work is stacked on top of the previous block, and so on, and so forth, making it stronger. At 99.98% uptime for 11 years, it's sticky enough to now last much longer than that. This network will be transferring and storing trillions of dollars within this decade and beyond.
[ Bitcoin ] After seven years in Bitcoin, I have never been more confident that this network is now absolutely unstoppable. Nothing short of an extinction level event can stop Bitcoin from slowly but surely growing as a global, agnostic, alternative network for storing and transferring value.
Topic originally posted in Bitcoin by Godfreee [link]
Back in 2013 when the entire market cap hit $1 Billion for the first time, it was really scary to put a considerable amount of money in BTC. You might like Bitcoin and find it interesting but doubt would still creep up in your mind about its staying power and the fact that one bug could bring it all down. Mt. Gox got hacked, 800,000 BTC stolen, it crashed from $1200 to $190 by 2015, so how do you even believe that 5 years later it would be a sustained $200+ billion market? Yet here we are. As long as the Bitcoin blockchain is churning out new blocks of unstoppable transactions, that's all that matters. Naysayers don't understand that this is all Bitcoin needs to do: Churn out new blocks every ten minutes. And with every new block, a monumental amount of energy and work is stacked on top of the previous block, and so on, and so forth, making it stronger. At 99.98% uptime for 11 years, it's sticky enough to now last much longer than that. This network will be transferring and storing trillions of dollars within this decade and beyond.
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Summary: Everyone knows that when you give your assets to someone else, they always keep them safe. If this is true for individuals, it is certainly true for businesses. Custodians always tell the truth and manage funds properly. They won't have any interest in taking the assets as an exchange operator would. Auditors tell the truth and can't be misled. That's because organizations that are regulated are incapable of lying and don't make mistakes. First, some background. Here is a summary of how custodians make us more secure: Previously, we might give Alice our crypto assets to hold. There were risks:
Alice might take the assets and disappear.
Alice might spend the assets and pretend that she still has them (fractional model).
Alice might store the assets insecurely and they'll get stolen.
Alice might give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force.
Alice might lose access to the assets.
But "no worries", Alice has a custodian named Bob. Bob is dressed in a nice suit. He knows some politicians. And he drives a Porsche. "So you have nothing to worry about!". And look at all the benefits we get:
Alice can't take the assets and disappear (unless she asks Bob or never gives them to Bob).
Alice can't spend the assets and pretend that she still has them. (Unless she didn't give them to Bob or asks him for them.)
Alice can't store the assets insecurely so they get stolen. (After all - she doesn't have any control over the withdrawal process from any of Bob's systems, right?)
Alice can't give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force. (Bob will stop her, right Bob?)
Alice can't lose access to the funds. (She'll always be present, sane, and remember all secrets, right?)
See - all problems are solved! All we have to worry about now is:
Bob might take the assets and disappear.
Bob might spend the assets and pretend that he still has them (fractional model).
Bob might store the assets insecurely and they'll get stolen.
Bob might give the assets to someone else by mistake or by force.
Bob might lose access to the assets.
It's pretty simple. Before we had to trust Alice. Now we only have to trust Alice, Bob, and all the ways in which they communicate. Just think of how much more secure we are! "On top of that", Bob assures us, "we're using a special wallet structure". Bob shows Alice a diagram. "We've broken the balance up and store it in lots of smaller wallets. That way", he assures her, "a thief can't take it all at once". And he points to a historic case where a large sum was taken "because it was stored in a single wallet... how stupid". "Very early on, we used to have all the crypto in one wallet", he said, "and then one Christmas a hacker came and took it all. We call him the Grinch. Now we individually wrap each crypto and stick it under a binary search tree. The Grinch has never been back since." "As well", Bob continues, "even if someone were to get in, we've got insurance. It covers all thefts and even coercion, collusion, and misplaced keys - only subject to the policy terms and conditions." And with that, he pulls out a phone-book sized contract and slams it on the desk with a thud. "Yep", he continues, "we're paying top dollar for one of the best policies in the country!" "Can I read it?' Alice asks. "Sure," Bob says, "just as soon as our legal team is done with it. They're almost through the first chapter." He pauses, then continues. "And can you believe that sales guy Mike? He has the same year Porsche as me. I mean, what are the odds?" "Do you use multi-sig?", Alice asks. "Absolutely!" Bob replies. "All our engineers are fully trained in multi-sig. Whenever we want to set up a new wallet, we generate 2 separate keys in an air-gapped process and store them in this proprietary system here. Look, it even requires the biometric signature from one of our team members to initiate any withdrawal." He demonstrates by pressing his thumb into the display. "We use a third-party cloud validation API to match the thumbprint and authorize each withdrawal. The keys are also backed up daily to an off-site third-party." "Wow that's really impressive," Alice says, "but what if we need access for a withdrawal outside of office hours?" "Well that's no issue", Bob says, "just send us an email, call, or text message and we always have someone on staff to help out. Just another part of our strong commitment to all our customers!" "What about Proof of Reserve?", Alice asks. "Of course", Bob replies, "though rather than publish any blockchain addresses or signed transaction, for privacy we just do a SHA256 refactoring of the inverse hash modulus for each UTXO nonce and combine the smart contract coefficient consensus in our hyperledger lightning node. But it's really simple to use." He pushes a button and a large green checkmark appears on a screen. "See - the algorithm ran through and reserves are proven." "Wow", Alice says, "you really know your stuff! And that is easy to use! What about fiat balances?" "Yeah, we have an auditor too", Bob replies, "Been using him for a long time so we have quite a strong relationship going! We have special books we give him every year and he's very efficient! Checks the fiat, crypto, and everything all at once!" "We used to have a nice offline multi-sig setup we've been using without issue for the past 5 years, but I think we'll move all our funds over to your facility," Alice says. "Awesome", Bob replies, "Thanks so much! This is perfect timing too - my Porsche got a dent on it this morning. We have the paperwork right over here." "Great!", Alice replies. And with that, Alice gets out her pen and Bob gets the contract. "Don't worry", he says, "you can take your crypto-assets back anytime you like - just subject to our cancellation policy. Our annual management fees are also super low and we don't adjust them often". How many holes have to exist for your funds to get stolen? Just one. Why are we taking a powerful offline multi-sig setup, widely used globally in hundreds of different/lacking regulatory environments with 0 breaches to date, and circumventing it by a demonstrably weak third party layer? And paying a great expense to do so? If you go through the list of breaches in the past 2 years to highly credible organizations, you go through the list of major corporate frauds (only the ones we know about), you go through the list of all the times platforms have lost funds, you go through the list of times and ways that people have lost their crypto from identity theft, hot wallet exploits, extortion, etc... and then you go through this custodian with a fine-tooth comb and truly believe they have value to add far beyond what you could, sticking your funds in a wallet (or set of wallets) they control exclusively is the absolute worst possible way to take advantage of that security. The best way to add security for crypto-assets is to make a stronger multi-sig. With one custodian, what you are doing is giving them your cryptocurrency and hoping they're honest, competent, and flawlessly secure. It's no different than storing it on a really secure exchange. Maybe the insurance will cover you. Didn't work for Bitpay in 2015. Didn't work for Yapizon in 2017. Insurance has never paid a claim in the entire history of cryptocurrency. But maybe you'll get lucky. Maybe your exact scenario will buck the trend and be what they're willing to cover. After the large deductible and hopefully without a long and expensive court battle. And you want to advertise this increase in risk, the lapse of judgement, an accident waiting to happen, as though it's some kind of benefit to customers ("Free institutional-grade storage for your digital assets.")? And then some people are writing to the OSC that custodians should be mandatory for all funds on every exchange platform? That this somehow will make Canadians as a whole more secure or better protected compared with standard air-gapped multi-sig? On what planet? Most of the problems in Canada stemmed from one thing - a lack of transparency. If Canadians had known what a joke Quadriga was - it wouldn't have grown to lose $400m from hard-working Canadians from coast to coast to coast. And Gerald Cotten would be in jail, not wherever he is now (at best, rotting peacefully). EZ-BTC and mister Dave Smilie would have been a tiny little scam to his friends, not a multi-million dollar fraud. Einstein would have got their act together or been shut down BEFORE losing millions and millions more in people's funds generously donated to criminals. MapleChange wouldn't have even been a thing. And maybe we'd know a little more about CoinTradeNewNote - like how much was lost in there. Almost all of the major losses with cryptocurrency exchanges involve deception with unbacked funds. So it's great to see transparency reports from BitBuy and ShakePay where someone independently verified the backing. The only thing we don't have is:
ANY CERTAINTY BALANCES WEREN'T EXCLUDED. Quadriga's largest account was $70m. 80% of funds are in 20% of accounts (Pareto principle). All it takes is excluding a few really large accounts - and nobody's the wiser. A fractional platform can easily pass any audit this way.
ANY VISIBILITY WHATSOEVER INTO THE CUSTODIANS. BitBuy put out their report before moving all the funds to their custodian and ShakePay apparently can't even tell us who the custodian is. That's pretty important considering that basically all of the funds are now stored there.
ANY IDEA ABOUT THE OTHER EXCHANGES. In order for this to be effective, it has to be the norm. It needs to be "unusual" not to know. If obscurity is the norm, then it's super easy for people like Gerald Cotten and Dave Smilie to blend right in.
It's not complicated to validate cryptocurrency assets. They need to exist, they need to be spendable, and they need to cover the total balances. There are plenty of credible people and firms across the country that have the capacity to reasonably perform this validation. Having more frequent checks by different, independent, parties who publish transparent reports is far more valuable than an annual check by a single "more credible/official" party who does the exact same basic checks and may or may not publish anything. Here's an example set of requirements that could be mandated:
First report within 1 month of launching, another within 3 months, and further reports at minimum every 6 months thereafter.
No auditor can be repeated within a 12 month period.
All reports must be public, identifying the auditor and the full methodology used.
All auditors must be independent of the firm being audited with no conflict of interest.
Reports must include the percentage of each asset backed, and how it's backed.
The auditor publishes a hash list, which lists a hash of each customer's information and balances that were included. Hash is one-way encryption so privacy is fully preserved. Every customer can use this to have 100% confidence they were included.
If we want more extensive requirements on audits, these should scale upward based on the total assets at risk on the platform, and whether the platform has loaned their assets out.
There are ways to structure audits such that neither crypto assets nor customer information are ever put at risk, and both can still be properly validated and publicly verifiable. There are also ways to structure audits such that they are completely reasonable for small platforms and don't inhibit innovation in any way. By making the process as reasonable as possible, we can completely eliminate any reason/excuse that an honest platform would have for not being audited. That is arguable far more important than any incremental improvement we might get from mandating "the best of the best" accountants. Right now we have nothing mandated and tons of Canadians using offshore exchanges with no oversight whatsoever. Transparency does not prove crypto assets are safe. CoinTradeNewNote, Flexcoin ($600k), and Canadian Bitcoins ($100k) are examples where crypto-assets were breached from platforms in Canada. All of them were online wallets and used no multi-sig as far as any records show. This is consistent with what we see globally - air-gapped multi-sig wallets have an impeccable record, while other schemes tend to suffer breach after breach. We don't actually know how much CoinTrader lost because there was no visibility. Rather than publishing details of what happened, the co-founder of CoinTrader silently moved on to found another platform - the "most trusted way to buy and sell crypto" - a site that has no information whatsoever (that I could find) on the storage practices and a FAQ advising that “[t]rading cryptocurrency is completely safe” and that having your own wallet is “entirely up to you! You can certainly keep cryptocurrency, or fiat, or both, on the app.” Doesn't sound like much was learned here, which is really sad to see. It's not that complicated or unreasonable to set up a proper hardware wallet. Multi-sig can be learned in a single course. Something the equivalent complexity of a driver's license test could prevent all the cold storage exploits we've seen to date - even globally. Platform operators have a key advantage in detecting and preventing fraud - they know their customers far better than any custodian ever would. The best job that custodians can do is to find high integrity individuals and train them to form even better wallet signatories. Rather than mandating that all platforms expose themselves to arbitrary third party risks, regulations should center around ensuring that all signatories are background-checked, properly trained, and using proper procedures. We also need to make sure that signatories are empowered with rights and responsibilities to reject and report fraud. They need to know that they can safely challenge and delay a transaction - even if it turns out they made a mistake. We need to have an environment where mistakes are brought to the surface and dealt with. Not one where firms and people feel the need to hide what happened. In addition to a knowledge-based test, an auditor can privately interview each signatory to make sure they're not in coercive situations, and we should make sure they can freely and anonymously report any issues without threat of retaliation. A proper multi-sig has each signature held by a separate person and is governed by policies and mutual decisions instead of a hierarchy. It includes at least one redundant signature. For best results, 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7. History has demonstrated over and over again the risk of hot wallets even to highly credible organizations. Nonetheless, many platforms have hot wallets for convenience. While such losses are generally compensated by platforms without issue (for example Poloniex, Bitstamp, Bitfinex, Gatecoin, Coincheck, Bithumb, Zaif, CoinBene, Binance, Bitrue, Bitpoint, Upbit, VinDAX, and now KuCoin), the public tends to focus more on cases that didn't end well. Regardless of what systems are employed, there is always some level of risk. For that reason, most members of the public would prefer to see third party insurance. Rather than trying to convince third party profit-seekers to provide comprehensive insurance and then relying on an expensive and slow legal system to enforce against whatever legal loopholes they manage to find each and every time something goes wrong, insurance could be run through multiple exchange operators and regulators, with the shared interest of having a reputable industry, keeping costs down, and taking care of Canadians. For example, a 4 of 7 multi-sig insurance fund held between 5 independent exchange operators and 2 regulatory bodies. All Canadian exchanges could pay premiums at a set rate based on their needed coverage, with a higher price paid for hot wallet coverage (anything not an air-gapped multi-sig cold wallet). Such a model would be much cheaper to manage, offer better coverage, and be much more reliable to payout when needed. The kind of coverage you could have under this model is unheard of. You could even create something like the CDIC to protect Canadians who get their trading accounts hacked if they can sufficiently prove the loss is legitimate. In cases of fraud, gross negligence, or insolvency, the fund can be used to pay affected users directly (utilizing the last transparent balance report in the worst case), something which private insurance would never touch. While it's recommended to have official policies for coverage, a model where members vote would fully cover edge cases. (Could be similar to the Supreme Court where justices vote based on case law.) Such a model could fully protect all Canadians across all platforms. You can have a fiat coverage governed by legal agreements, and crypto-asset coverage governed by both multi-sig and legal agreements. It could be practical, affordable, and inclusive. Now, we are at a crossroads. We can happily give up our freedom, our innovation, and our money. We can pay hefty expenses to auditors, lawyers, and regulators year after year (and make no mistake - this cost will grow to many millions or even billions as the industry grows - and it will be borne by all Canadians on every platform because platforms are not going to eat up these costs at a loss). We can make it nearly impossible for any new platform to enter the marketplace, forcing Canadians to use the same stagnant platforms year after year. We can centralize and consolidate the entire industry into 2 or 3 big players and have everyone else fail (possibly to heavy losses of users of those platforms). And when a flawed security model doesn't work and gets breached, we can make it even more complicated with even more people in suits making big money doing the job that blockchain was supposed to do in the first place. We can build a system which is so intertwined and dependent on big government, traditional finance, and central bankers that it's future depends entirely on that of the fiat system, of fractional banking, and of government bail-outs. If we choose this path, as history has shown us over and over again, we can not go back, save for revolution. Our children and grandchildren will still be paying the consequences of what we decided today. Or, we can find solutions that work. We can maintain an open and innovative environment while making the adjustments we need to make to fully protect Canadian investors and cryptocurrency users, giving easy and affordable access to cryptocurrency for all Canadians on the platform of their choice, and creating an environment in which entrepreneurs and problem solvers can bring those solutions forward easily. None of the above precludes innovation in any way, or adds any unreasonable cost - and these three policies would demonstrably eliminate or resolve all 109 historic cases as studied here - that's every single case researched so far going back to 2011. It includes every loss that was studied so far not just in Canada but globally as well. Unfortunately, finding answers is the least challenging part. Far more challenging is to get platform operators and regulators to agree on anything. My last post got no response whatsoever, and while the OSC has told me they're happy for industry feedback, I believe my opinion alone is fairly meaningless. This takes the whole community working together to solve. So please let me know your thoughts. Please take the time to upvote and share this with people. Please - let's get this solved and not leave it up to other people to do. Facts/background/sources (skip if you like):
The inspiration for the paragraph about splitting wallets was an actual quote from a Canadian company providing custodial services in response to the OSC consultation paper: "We believe that it will be in the in best interests of investors to prohibit pooled crypto assets or ‘floats’. Most Platforms pool assets, citing reasons of practicality and expense. The recent hack of the world’s largest Platform – Binance – demonstrates the vulnerability of participants’ assets when such concessions are made. In this instance, the Platform’s entire hot wallet of Bitcoins, worth over $40 million, was stolen, facilitated in part by the pooling of client crypto assets." "the maintenance of participants (and Platform) crypto assets across multiple wallets distributes the related risk and responsibility of security - reducing the amount of insurance coverage required and making insurance coverage more readily obtainable". For the record, their reply also said nothing whatsoever about multi-sig or offline storage.
In addition to the fact that the $40m hack represented only one "hot wallet" of Binance, and they actually had the vast majority of assets in other wallets (including mostly cold wallets), multiple real cases have clearly demonstrated that risk is still present with multiple wallets. Bitfinex, VinDAX, Bithumb, Altsbit, BitPoint, Cryptopia, and just recently KuCoin all had multiple wallets breached all at the same time, and may represent a significantly larger impact on customers than the Binance breach which was fully covered by Binance. To represent that simply having multiple separate wallets under the same security scheme is a comprehensive way to reduce risk is just not true.
Private insurance has historically never covered a single loss in the cryptocurrency space (at least, not one that I was able to find), and there are notable cases where massive losses were not covered by insurance. Bitpay in 2015 and Yapizon in 2017 both had insurance policies that didn't pay out during the breach, even after a lengthly court process. The same insurance that ShakePay is presently using (and announced to much fanfare) was describe by their CEO himself as covering “physical theft of the media where the private keys are held,” which is something that has never historically happened. As was said with regard to the same policy in 2018 - “I don’t find it surprising that Lloyd’s is in this space,” said Johnson, adding that to his mind the challenge for everybody is figuring out how to structure these policies so that they are actually protective. “You can create an insurance policy that protects no one – you know there are so many caveats to the policy that it’s not super protective.”
The most profitable policy for a private insurance company is one with the most expensive premiums that they never have to pay a claim on. They have no inherent incentive to take care of people who lost funds. It's "cheaper" to take the reputational hit and fight the claim in court. The more money at stake, the more the insurance provider is incentivized to avoid payout. They're not going to insure the assets unless they have reasonable certainty to make a profit by doing so, and they're not going to pay out a massive sum unless it's legally forced. Private insurance is always structured to be maximally profitable to the insurance provider.
The circumvention of multi-sig was a key factor in the massive Bitfinex hack of over $60m of bitcoin, which today still sits being slowly used and is worth over $3b. While Bitfinex used a qualified custodian Bitgo, which was and still is active and one of the industry leaders of custodians, and they set up 2 of 3 multi-sig wallets, the entire system was routed through Bitfinex, such that Bitfinex customers could initiate the withdrawals in a "hot" fashion. This feature was also a hit with the hacker. The multi-sig was fully circumvented.
Bitpay in 2015 was another example of a breach that stole 5,000 bitcoins. This happened not through the exploit of any system in Bitpay, but because the CEO of a company they worked with got their computer hacked and the hackers were able to request multiple bitcoin purchases, which Bitpay honoured because they came from the customer's computer legitimately. Impersonation is a very common tactic used by fraudsters, and methods get more extreme all the time.
A notable case in Canada was the Canadian Bitcoins exploit. Funds were stored on a server in a Rogers Data Center, and the attendee was successfully convinced to reboot the server "in safe mode" with a simple phone call, thus bypassing the extensive security and enabling the theft.
The very nature of custodians circumvents multi-sig. This is because custodians are not just having to secure the assets against some sort of physical breach but against any form of social engineering, modification of orders, fraudulent withdrawal attempts, etc... If the security practices of signatories in a multi-sig arrangement are such that the breach risk of one signatory is 1 in 100, the requirement of 3 independent signatures makes the risk of theft 1 in 1,000,000. Since hackers tend to exploit the weakest link, a comparable custodian has to make the entry and exit points of their platform 10,000 times more secure than one of those signatories to provide equivalent protection. And if the signatories beef up their security by only 10x, the risk is now 1 in 1,000,000,000. The custodian has to be 1,000,000 times more secure. The larger and more complex a system is, the more potential vulnerabilities exist in it, and the fewer people can understand how the system works when performing upgrades. Even if a system is completely secure today, one has to also consider how that system might evolve over time or work with different members.
By contrast, offline multi-signature solutions have an extremely solid record, and in the entire history of cryptocurrency exchange incidents which I've studied (listed here), there has only been one incident (796 exchange in 2015) involving an offline multi-signature wallet. It happened because the customer's bitcoin address was modified by hackers, and the amount that was stolen ($230k) was immediately covered by the exchange operators. Basically, the platform operators were tricked into sending a legitimate withdrawal request to the wrong address because hackers exploited their platform to change that address. Such an issue would not be prevented in any way by the use of a custodian, as that custodian has no oversight whatsoever to the exchange platform. It's practical for all exchange operators to test large withdrawal transactions as a general policy, regardless of what model is used, and general best practice is to diagnose and fix such an exploit as soon as it occurs.
False promises on the backing of funds played a huge role in the downfall of Quadriga, and it's been exposed over and over again (MyCoin, PlusToken, Bitsane, Bitmarket, EZBTC, IDAX). Even today, customers have extremely limited certainty on whether their funds in exchanges are actually being backed or how they're being backed. While this issue is not unique to cryptocurrency exchanges, the complexity of the technology and the lack of any regulation or standards makes problems more widespread, and there is no "central bank" to come to the rescue as in the 2008 financial crisis or during the great depression when "9,000 banks failed".
In addition to fraudulent operations, the industry is full of cases where operators have suffered breaches and not reported them. Most recently, Einstein was the largest case in Canada, where ongoing breaches and fraud were perpetrated against the platform for multiple years and nobody found out until the platform collapsed completely. While fraud and breaches suck to deal with, they suck even more when not dealt with. Lack of visibility played a role in the largest downfalls of Mt. Gox, Cryptsy, and Bitgrail. In some cases, platforms are alleged to have suffered a hack and keep operating without admitting it at all, such as CoinBene.
It surprises some to learn that a cryptographic solution has already existed since 2013, and gained widespread support in 2014 after Mt. Gox. Proof of Reserves is a full cryptographic proof that allows any customer using an exchange to have complete certainty that their crypto-assets are fully backed by the platform in real-time. This is accomplished by proving that assets exist on the blockchain, are spendable, and fully cover customer deposits. It does not prove safety of assets or backing of fiat assets.
If we didn't care about privacy at all, a platform could publish their wallet addresses, sign a partial transaction, and put the full list of customer information and balances out publicly. Customers can each check that they are on the list, that the balances are accurate, that the total adds up, and that it's backed and spendable on the blockchain. Platforms who exclude any customer take a risk because that customer can easily check and see they were excluded. So together with all customers checking, this forms a full proof of backing of all crypto assets.
However, obviously customers care about their private information being published. Therefore, a hash of the information can be provided instead. Hash is one-way encryption. The hash allows the customer to validate inclusion (by hashing their own known information), while anyone looking at the list of hashes cannot determine the private information of any other user. All other parts of the scheme remain fully intact. A model like this is in use on the exchange CoinFloor in the UK.
A Merkle tree can provide even greater privacy. Instead of a list of balances, the balances are arranged into a binary tree. A customer starts from their node, and works their way to the top of the tree. For example, they know they have 5 BTC, they plus 1 other customer hold 7 BTC, they plus 2-3 other customers hold 17 BTC, etc... until they reach the root where all the BTC are represented. Thus, there is no way to find the balances of other individual customers aside from one unidentified customer in this case.
Proposals such as this had the backing of leaders in the community including Nic Carter, Greg Maxwell, and Zak Wilcox. Substantial and significant effort started back in 2013, with massive popularity in 2014. But what became of that effort? Very little. Exchange operators continue to refuse to give visibility. Despite the fact this information can often be obtained through trivial blockchain analysis, no Canadian platform has ever provided any wallet addresses publicly. As described by the CEO of Newton "For us to implement some kind of realtime Proof of Reserves solution, which I'm not opposed to, it would have to ... Preserve our users' privacy, as well as our own. Some kind of zero-knowledge proof". Kraken describes here in more detail why they haven't implemented such a scheme. According to professor Eli Ben-Sasson, when he spoke with exchanges, none were interested in implementing Proof of Reserves.
And yet, Kraken's places their reasoning on a page called "Proof of Reserves". More recently, both BitBuy and ShakePay have released reports titled "Proof of Reserves and Security Audit". Both reports contain disclaimers against being audits. Both reports trust the customer list provided by the platform, leaving the open possibility that multiple large accounts could have been excluded from the process. Proof of Reserves is a blockchain validation where customers see the wallets on the blockchain. The report from Kraken is 5 years old, but they leave it described as though it was just done a few weeks ago. And look at what they expect customers to do for validation. When firms represent something being "Proof of Reserve" when it's not, this is like a farmer growing fruit with pesticides and selling it in a farmers market as organic produce - except that these are people's hard-earned life savings at risk here. Platforms are misrepresenting the level of visibility in place and deceiving the public by their misuse of this term. They haven't proven anything.
Fraud isn't a problem that is unique to cryptocurrency. Fraud happens all the time. Enron, WorldCom, Nortel, Bear Stearns, Wells Fargo, Moser Baer, Wirecard, Bre-X, and Nicola are just some of the cases where frauds became large enough to become a big deal (and there are so many countless others). These all happened on 100% reversible assets despite regulations being in place. In many of these cases, the problems happened due to the over-complexity of the financial instruments. For example, Enron had "complex financial statements [which] were confusing to shareholders and analysts", creating "off-balance-sheet vehicles, complex financing structures, and deals so bewildering that few people could understand them". In cryptocurrency, we are often combining complex financial products with complex technologies and verification processes. We are naïve if we think problems like this won't happen. It is awkward and uncomfortable for many people to admit that they don't know how something works. If we want "money of the people" to work, the solutions have to be simple enough that "the people" can understand them, not so confusing that financial professionals and technology experts struggle to use or understand them.
For those who question the extent to which an organization can fool their way into a security consultancy role, HB Gary should be a great example to look at. Prior to trying to out anonymous, HB Gary was being actively hired by multiple US government agencies and others in the private sector (with glowing testimonials). The published articles and hosted professional security conferences. One should also look at this list of data breaches from the past 2 years. Many of them are large corporations, government entities, and technology companies. These are the ones we know about. Undoubtedly, there are many more that we do not know about. If HB Gary hadn't been "outted" by anonymous, would we have known they were insecure? If the same breach had happened outside of the public spotlight, would it even have been reported? Or would HB Gary have just deleted the Twitter posts, brought their site back up, done a couple patches, and kept on operating as though nothing had happened?
In the case of Quadriga, the facts are clear. Despite past experience with platforms such as MapleChange in Canada and others around the world, no guidance or even the most basic of a framework was put in place by regulators. By not clarifying any sort of legal framework, regulators enabled a situation where a platform could be run by former criminal Mike Dhanini/Omar Patryn, and where funds could be held fully unchecked by one person. At the same time, the lack of regulation deterred legitimate entities from running competing platforms and Quadriga was granted a money services business license for multiple years of operation, which gave the firm the appearance of legitimacy. Regulators did little to protect Canadians despite Quadriga failing to file taxes from 2016 onward. The entire administrative team had resigned and this was public knowledge. Many people had suspicions of what was going on, including Ryan Mueller, who forwarded complaints to the authorities. These were ignored, giving Gerald Cotten the opportunity to escape without justice.
There are multiple issues with the SOC II model including the prohibitive cost (you have to find a third party accounting firm and the prices are not even listed publicly on any sites), the requirement of operating for a year (impossible for new platforms), and lack of any public visibility (SOC II are private reports that aren't shared outside the people in suits).
Securities frameworks are expensive. Sarbanes-Oxley is estimated to cost $5.1 million USD/yr for the average Fortune 500 company in the United States. Since "Fortune 500" represents the top 500 companies, that means well over $2.55 billion USD (~$3.4 billion CAD) is going to people in suits. Isn't the problem of trust and verification the exact problem that the blockchain is supposed to solve?
To use Quadriga as justification for why custodians or SOC II or other advanced schemes are needed for platforms is rather silly, when any framework or visibility at all, or even the most basic of storage policies, would have prevented the whole thing. It's just an embarrassment.
We are now seeing regulators take strong action. CoinSquare in Canada with multi-million dollar fines. BitMex from the US, criminal charges and arrests. OkEx, with full disregard of withdrawals and no communication. Who's next?
We have a unique window today where we can solve these problems, and not permanently destroy innovation with unreasonable expectations, but we need to act quickly. This is a unique historic time that will never come again.
In December 2015, two parallel investigations by Wired and Gizmodo suggested that Wright may have been the inventor of bitcoin. Subsequent reporting, however, raised concerns that Wright was engaged in an elaborate hoax. Hours after Wired published their allegations, Wright's home in Gordon, New South Wales and associated business premises in Ryde, New South Wales were raided by the Australian Federal Police. According to the AFP, the raid was part of an Australian Tax Office investigation. On 2 May 2016, the BBC and The Economist published articles claiming that Wright had digitally signed messages using cryptographic keys created during the early days of bitcoin's development. The keys are inextricably linked to blocks of bitcoins known to have been created or "mined" by Satoshi Nakamoto
Self-proclaimed Bitcoin inventor Craig Wright has appeared to claim that he was the hacker of Bitcoin exchange Mt. Gox in 2011, when 79,956 Bitcoin—worth $751 million today—was stolen. In a letter sent to Bitcoin services provider Blockstream, Wright’s law firm SCA Ontier alleges that he has control over two Bitcoin addresses. One of the addresses specified is the same address that received the Bitcoin stolen from Mt. Gox, according to then Mt. Gox CEO Mark Karpeles.
How To End The Cryptocurrency Exchange "Wild West" Without Crippling Innovation
In case you haven't noticed the consultation paper, staff notice, and report on Quadriga, regulators are now clamping down on Canadian cryptocurrency exchanges. The OSC and other regulatory bodies are still interested in industry feedback. They have not put forward any official regulation yet. Below are some ideas/insights and a proposed framework.
Typical securities frameworks will cost Canadians millions of dollars (ie Sarbanes-Oxley estimated at $5m USD/yr per firm). Implementation costs of this proposal are significantly cheaper.
Canadians can maintain a diverse set of exchanges, multiple viable business models are still fully supported, and innovation is encouraged while keeping Canadians safe.
Many of you have limited time to read the full proposal, so here are the highlights:
Effective standards to prevent both internal and external theft. Exchange operators are trained and certified, and have a legal responsibility to users.
Regular Transparent Audits
Provides visibility to Canadians that their funds are fully backed on the exchange, while protecting privacy and sensitive platform information.
Establishment of basic insurance standards/strategy, to expand over time. Removing risk to exchange users of any hot wallet theft.
Background and Justifications
Cold Storage Custody/Management After reviewing close to 100 cases, all thefts tend to break down into more or less the same set of problems: • Funds stored online or in a smart contract, • Access controlled by one person or one system, • 51% attacks (rare), • Funds sent to the wrong address (also rare), or • Some combination of the above. For the first two cases, practical solutions exist and are widely implemented on exchanges already. Offline multi-signature solutions are already industry standard. No cases studied found an external theft or exit scam involving an offline multi-signature wallet implementation. Security can be further improved through minimum numbers of signatories, background checks, providing autonomy and legal protections to each signatory, establishing best practices, and a training/certification program. The last two transaction risks occur more rarely, and have never resulted in a loss affecting the actual users of the exchange. In all cases to date where operators made the mistake, they've been fully covered by the exchange platforms. • 51% attacks generally only occur on blockchains with less security. The most prominent cases have been Bitcoin Gold and Ethereum Classic. The simple solution is to enforce deposit limits and block delays such that a 51% attack is not cost-effective. • The risk of transactions to incorrect addresses can be eliminated by a simple test transaction policy on large transactions. By sending a small amount of funds prior to any large withdrawals/transfers as a standard practice, the accuracy of the wallet address can be validated. The proposal covers all loss cases and goes beyond, while avoiding significant additional costs, risks, and limitations which may be associated with other frameworks like SOC II. On The Subject of Third Party Custodians Many Canadian platforms are currently experimenting with third party custody. From the standpoint of the exchange operator, they can liberate themselves from some responsibility of custody, passing that off to someone else. For regulators, it puts crypto in similar categorization to oil, gold, and other commodities, with some common standards. Platform users would likely feel greater confidence if the custodian was a brand they recognized. If the custodian was knowledgeable and had a decent team that employed multi-sig, they could keep assets safe from internal theft. With the right protections in place, this could be a great solution for many exchanges, particularly those that lack the relevant experience or human resources for their own custody systems. However, this system is vulnerable to anyone able to impersonate the exchange operators. You may have a situation where different employees who don't know each other that well are interacting between different companies (both the custodian and all their customers which presumably isn't just one exchange). A case study of what can go wrong in this type of environment might be Bitpay, where the CEO was tricked out of 5000 bitcoins over 3 separate payments by a series of emails sent legitimately from a breached computer of another company CEO. It's also still vulnerable to the platform being compromised, as in the really large $70M Bitfinex hack, where the third party Bitgo held one key in a multi-sig wallet. The hacker simply authorized the withdrawal using the same credentials as Bitfinex (requesting Bitgo to sign multiple withdrawal transactions). This succeeded even with the use of multi-sig and two heavily security-focused companies, due to the lack of human oversight (basically, hot wallet). Of course, you can learn from these cases and improve the security, but so can hackers improve their deception and at the end of the day, both of these would have been stopped by the much simpler solution of a qualified team who knew each other and employed multi-sig with properly protected keys. It's pretty hard to beat a human being who knows the business and the typical customer behaviour (or even knows their customers personally) at spotting fraud, and the proposed multi-sig means any hacker has to get through the scrutiny of 3 (or more) separate people, all of whom would have proper training including historical case studies. There are strong arguments both for and against using use of third party custodians. The proposal sets mandatory minimum custody standards would apply regardless if the cold wallet signatories are exchange operators, independent custodians, or a mix of both. On The Subject Of Insurance ShakePay has taken the first steps into this new realm (congratulations). There is no question that crypto users could be better protected by the right insurance policies, and it certainly feels better to transact with insured platforms. The steps required to obtain insurance generally place attention in valuable security areas, and in this case included a review from CipherTrace. One of the key solutions in traditional finance comes from insurance from entities such as the CDIC. However, historically, there wasn't found any actual insurance payout to any cryptocurrency exchange, and there are notable cases where insurance has not paid. With Bitpay, for example, the insurance agent refused because the issue happened to the third party CEO's computer instead of anything to do with Bitpay itself. With the Youbit exchange in South Korea, their insurance claim was denied, and the exchange ultimately ended up instead going bankrupt with all user's funds lost. To quote Matt Johnson in the original Lloyd's article: “You can create an insurance policy that protects no one – you know there are so many caveats to the policy that it’s not super protective.” ShakePay's insurance was only reported to cover their cold storage, and “physical theft of the media where the private keys are held”. Physical theft has never, in the history of cryptocurrency exchange cases reviewed, been reported as the cause of loss. From the limited information of the article, ShakePay made it clear their funds are in the hands of a single US custodian, and at least part of their security strategy is to "decline to confirm the custodian’s name on the record". While this prevents scrutiny of the custodian, it's pretty silly to speculate that a reasonably competent hacking group couldn't determine who the custodian is. A far more common infiltration strategy historically would be social engineering, which has succeeded repeatedly. A hacker could trick their way into ShakePay's systems and request a fraudulent withdrawal, impersonate ShakePay and request the custodian to move funds, or socially engineer their way into the custodian to initiate the withdrawal of multiple accounts (a payout much larger than ShakePay) exploiting the standard procedures (for example, fraudulently initiating or override the wallet addresses of a real transfer). In each case, nothing was physically stolen and the loss is therefore not covered by insurance. In order for any insurance to be effective, clear policies have to be established about what needs to be covered. Anything short of that gives Canadians false confidence that they are protected when they aren't in any meaningful way. At this time, the third party insurance market does not appear to provide adequate options or coverage, and effort is necessary to standardize custody standards, which is a likely first step in ultimately setting up an insurance framework. A better solution compared to third party insurance providers might be for Canadian exchange operators to create their own collective insurance fund, or a specific federal organization similar to the CDIC. Such an organization would have a greater interest or obligation in paying out actual cases, and that would be it's purpose rather than maximizing it's own profit. This would be similar to the SAFU which Binance has launched, except it would cover multiple exchanges. There is little question whether the SAFU would pay out given a breach of Binance, and a similar argument could be made for a insurance fund managed by a collective of exchange operators or a government organization. While a third party insurance provider has the strong market incentive to provide the absolute minimum coverage and no market incentive to payout, an entity managed by exchange operators would have incentive to protect the reputation of exchange operators/the industry, and the government should have the interest of protecting Canadians. On The Subject of Fractional Reserve There is a long history of fractional reserve failures, from the first banks in ancient times, through the great depression (where hundreds of fractional reserve banks failed), right through to the 2008 banking collapse referenced in the first bitcoin block. The fractional reserve system allows banks to multiply the money supply far beyond the actual cash (or other assets) in existence, backed only by a system of debt obligations of others. Safely supporting a fractional reserve system is a topic of far greater complexity than can be addressed by a simple policy, and when it comes to cryptocurrency, there is presently no entity reasonably able to bail anyone out in the event of failure. Therefore, this framework is addressed around entities that aim to maintain 100% backing of funds. There may be some firms that desire but have failed to maintain 100% backing. In this case, there are multiple solutions, including outside investment, merging with other exchanges, or enforcing a gradual restoration plan. All of these solutions are typically far better than shutting down the exchange, and there are multiple cases where they've been used successfully in the past. Proof of Reserves/Transparency/Accountability Canadians need to have visibility into the backing on an ongoing basis. The best solution for crypto-assets is a Proof of Reserve. Such ideas go back all the way to 2013, before even Mt. Gox. However, no Canadian exchange has yet implemented such a system, and only a few international exchanges (CoinFloor in the UK being an example) have. Many firms like Kraken, BitBuy, and now ShakePay use the Proof of Reserve term to refer to lesser proofs which do not actually cryptographically prove the full backing of all user assets on the blockchain. In order for a Proof of Reserve to be effective, it must actually be a complete proof, and it needs to be understood by the public that is expected to use it. Many firms have expressed reservations about the level of transparency required in a complete Proof of Reserve (for example Kraken here). While a complete Proof of Reserves should be encouraged, and there are some solutions in the works (ie TxQuick), this is unlikely to be suitable universally for all exchange operators and users. Given the limitations, and that firms also manage fiat assets, a more traditional audit process makes more sense. Some Canadian exchanges (CoinSquare, CoinBerry) have already subjected themselves to annual audits. However, these results are not presently shared publicly, and there is no guarantee over the process including all user assets or the integrity and independence of the auditor. The auditor has been typically not known, and in some cases, the identity of the auditor is protected by a NDA. Only in one case (BitBuy) was an actual report generated and publicly shared. There has been no attempt made to validate that user accounts provided during these audits have been complete or accurate. A fraudulent fractional exchange, or one which had suffered a breach they were unwilling to publicly accept (see CoinBene), could easily maintain a second set of books for auditors or simply exclude key accounts to pass an individual audit. The proposed solution would see a reporting standard which includes at a minimum - percentage of backing for each asset relative to account balances and the nature of how those assets are stored, with ownership proven by the auditor. The auditor would also publicly provide a "hash list", which they independently generate from the accounts provided by the exchange. Every exchange user can then check their information against this public "hash list". A hash is a one-way form of encryption, which fully protects the private information, yet allows anyone who knows that information already to validate that it was included. Less experienced users can take advantage of public tools to calculate the hash from their information (provided by the exchange), and thus have certainty that the auditor received their full balance information. Easy instructions can be provided. Auditors should be impartial, their identities and process public, and they should be rotated so that the same auditor is never used twice in a row. Balancing the cost of auditing against the needs for regular updates, a 6 month cycle likely makes the most sense. Hot Wallet Management The best solution for hot wallets is not to use them. CoinBerry reportedly uses multi-sig on all withdrawals, and Bitmex is an international example known for their structure devoid of hot wallets. However, many platforms and customers desire fast withdrawal processes, and human validation has a cost of time and delay in this process. A model of self-insurance or separate funds for hot wallets may be used in these cases. Under this model, a platform still has 100% of their client balance in cold storage and holds additional funds in hot wallets for quick withdrawal. Thus, the risk of those hot wallets is 100% on exchange operators and not affecting the exchange users. Since most platforms typically only have 1%-5% in hot wallets at any given time, it shouldn't be unreasonable to build/maintain these additional reserves over time using exchange fees or additional investment. Larger withdrawals would still be handled at regular intervals from the cold storage. Hot wallet risks have historically posed a large risk and there is no established standard to guarantee secure hot wallets. When the government of South Korea dispatched security inspections to multiple exchanges, the results were still that 3 of them got hacked after the inspections. If standards develop such that an organization in the market is willing to insure the hot wallets, this could provide an acceptable alternative. Another option may be for multiple exchange operators to pool funds aside for a hot wallet insurance fund. Comprehensive coverage standards must be established and maintained for all hot wallet balances to make sure Canadians are adequately protected.
Current Draft Proposal
(1) Proper multi-signature cold wallet storage. (a) Each private key is the personal and legal responsibility of one person - the “signatory”. Signatories have special rights and responsibilities to protect user assets. Signatories are trained and certified through a course covering (1) past hacking and fraud cases, (2) proper and secure key generation, and (3) proper safekeeping of private keys. All private keys must be generated and stored 100% offline by the signatory. If even one private keys is ever breached or suspected to be breached, the wallet must be regenerated and all funds relocated to a new wallet. (b) All signatories must be separate background-checked individuals free of past criminal conviction. Canadians should have a right to know who holds their funds. All signing of transactions must take place with all signatories on Canadian soil or on the soil of a country with a solid legal system which agrees to uphold and support these rules (from an established white-list of countries which expands over time). (c) 3-5 independent signatures are required for any withdrawal. There must be 1-3 spare signatories, and a maximum of 7 total signatories. The following are all valid combinations: 3of4, 3of5, 3of6, 4of5, 4of6, 4of7, 5of6, or 5of7. (d) A security audit should be conducted to validate the cold wallet is set up correctly and provide any additional pertinent information. The primary purpose is to ensure that all signatories are acting independently and using best practices for private key storage. A report summarizing all steps taken and who did the audit will be made public. Canadians must be able to validate the right measures are in place to protect their funds. (e) There is a simple approval process if signatories wish to visit any country outside Canada, with a potential whitelist of exempt countries. At most 2 signatories can be outside of aligned jurisdiction at any given time. All exchanges would be required to keep a compliant cold wallet for Canadian funds and have a Canadian office if they wish to serve Canadian customers. (2) Regular and transparent solvency audits. (a) An audit must be conducted at founding, after 3 months of operation, and at least once every 6 months to compare customer balances against all stored cryptocurrency and fiat balances. The auditor must be known, independent, and never the same twice in a row. (b) An audit report will be published featuring the steps conducted in a readable format. This should be made available to all Canadians on the exchange website and on a government website. The report must include what percentage of each customer asset is backed on the exchange, and how those funds are stored. (c) The auditor will independently produce a hash of each customer's identifying information and balance as they perform the audit. This will be made publicly available on the exchange and government website, along with simplified instructions that each customer can use to verify that their balance was included in the audit process. (d) The audit needs to include a proof of ownership for any cryptocurrency wallets included. A satoshi test (spending a small amount) or partially signed transaction both qualify. (e) Any platform without 100% reserves should be assessed on a regular basis by a government or industry watchdog. This entity should work to prevent any further drop, support any private investor to come in, or facilitate a merger so that 100% backing can be obtained as soon as possible. (3) Protections for hot wallets and transactions. (a) A standardized list of approved coins and procedures will be established to constitute valid cold storage wallets. Where a multi-sig process is not natively available, efforts will be undertaken to establish a suitable and stable smart contract standard. This list will be expanded and improved over time. Coins and procedures not on the list are considered hot wallets. (b) Hot wallets can be backed by additional funds in cold storage or an acceptable third-party insurance provider with a comprehensive coverage policy. (c) Exchanges are required to cover the full balance of all user funds as denominated in the same currency, or double the balance as denominated in bitcoin or CAD using an established trading rate. If the balance is ever insufficient due to market movements, the firm must rectify this within 24 hours by moving assets to cold storage or increasing insurance coverage. (d) Any large transactions (above a set threshold) from cold storage to any new wallet addresses (not previously transacted with) must be tested with a smaller transaction first. Deposits of cryptocurrency must be limited to prevent economic 51% attacks. Any issues are to be covered by the exchange. (e) Exchange platforms must provide suitable authentication for users, including making available approved forms of two-factor authentication. SMS-based authentication is not to be supported. Withdrawals must be blocked for 48 hours in the event of any account password change. Disputes on the negligence of exchanges should be governed by case law.
Continued review of existing OSC feedback is still underway. More feedback and opinions on the framework and ideas as presented here are extremely valuable. The above is a draft and not finalized. The process of further developing and bringing a suitable framework to protect Canadians will require the support of exchange operators, legal experts, and many others in the community. The costs of not doing such are tremendous. A large and convoluted framework, one based on flawed ideas or implementation, or one which fails to properly safeguard Canadians is not just extremely expensive and risky for all Canadians, severely limiting to the credibility and reputation of the industry, but an existential risk to many exchanges. The responsibility falls to all of us to provide our insight and make our opinions heard on this critical matter. Please take the time to give your thoughts.
Crypto-Powered: Understanding Bitcoin, Ethereum, and DeFi
Until one understands the basics of this tech, they won’t be able to grasp or appreciate the impact it has on our digital bank, Genesis Block. https://reddit.com/link/ho4bif/video/n0euarkifu951/player This is the second post ofCrypto-Powered— a new series that examines what it means forGenesis Blockto be a digital bank that’s powered by crypto, blockchain, and decentralized protocols. --- Our previous post set the stage for this series. We discussed the state of consumer finance and how the success of today’s high-flying fintech unicorns will be short-lived as long as they’re building on legacy finance — a weak foundation that is ripe for massive disruption. Instead, the future of consumer finance belongs to those who are deeply familiar with blockchain tech & decentralized protocols, build on it as the foundation, and know how to take it to the world. Like Genesis Block. Today we begin our journey down the crypto rabbit hole. This post will be an important introduction for those still learning about Bitcoin, Ethereum, or DeFi (Decentralized Finance). This post (and the next few) will go into greater detail about how this technology gives Genesis Block an edge, a superpower, and an unfair advantage. Let’s dive in… https://preview.redd.it/1ugdxoqjfu951.jpg?width=650&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=36edde1079c3cff5f6b15b8cd30e6c436626d5d8
Bitcoin: The First Cryptocurrency
There are plenty of online resources to learn about Bitcoin (Coinbase, Binance, Gemini, Naval, Alex Gladstein, Marc Andreessen, Chris Dixon). I don’t wanna spend a lot of time on that here, but let’s do a quick overview for those still getting ramped up. Cryptocurrency is the most popular use-case of blockchain technology today. And Bitcoin was the first cryptocurrency to be invented.
Bitcoin is the most decentralized of all crypto assets today — no government, company, or third party can control or censor it.
Bitcoin has two primary features (as do most other cryptocurrencies):
Send Value You can send value to anyone, anywhere in the world. Nobody can intercept, delay or stop it — not even governments or financial institutions. Unlike with traditional money transfers or bank wires, there are no layers of middlemen. This results in a process that is much more cost-efficient. Some popular use-cases include remittances and cross-border payments.
A few negative moments in Bitcoin’s history include the collapse of Mt. Gox — which resulted in hundreds of millions of customer funds being stolen — as well as Bitcoin’s role in dark markets like Silk Road — where Bitcoin arguably found its initial userbase. However, like most breakthrough technology, Bitcoin is neither good nor bad. It’s neutral. People can use it for good or they can use it for evil. Thankfully, it’s being used less and less for illicit activity. Criminals are starting to understand that transactions on a blockchain are public and traceable — it’s exactly the type of system they usually try to avoid. And it’s true, at this point “a lot more” crimes are actually committed with fiat than crypto. As a result, the perception of bitcoin and cryptocurrency has been changing over the years to a more positive light. Bitcoin has even started to enter the world of media & entertainment. It’s been mentioned in Hollywood films like Spiderman: Into the Spider-Verse and in songs from major artists like Eminem. It’s been mentioned in countless TV shows like Billions, The Simpsons, Big Bang Theory, Gray’s Anatomy, Family Guy, and more. As covid19 has ravaged economies and central banks have been printing money, Bitcoin has caught the attention of many legendary Wall Street investors like Paul Tudor Jones, saying that Bitcoin is a great bet against inflation (reminding him of Gold in the 1970s). Cash App already lets their 25M users buy Bitcoin. It’s rumored that PayPal and Venmo will soon let their 325M users start buying Bitcoin. Bitcoin is by far the most dominant cryptocurrency and is showing no signs of slowing down. For more than a decade it has delivered on its core use-cases — being able to send or store value.
At this point, Bitcoin has very much entered the zeitgeist of modern pop culture — at least in the West.
When Ethereum launched in 2015, it opened up a world of new possibilities and use-cases for crypto. With Ethereum Smart Contracts (i.e. applications), this exciting new digital money (cryptocurrency) became a lot less dumb. Developers could now build applications that go beyond the simple use-cases of “send value” & “store value.” They could program cryptocurrency to have rules, behavior, and logic to respond to different inputs. And always enforced by code. Additional reading on Ethereum fromLinda XieorVitalik Buterin.
Because these applications are built on blockchain technology (Ethereum), they preserve many of the same characteristics as Bitcoin: no one can stop, censor or shut down these apps because they are decentralized.
Just as tokens grew in popularity in 2017–2018, so did online marketplaces where these tokens could be bought, sold, and traded. This was a fledgling asset class — the merchants selling picks, axes, and shovels were finally starting to emerge.
I had a front-row seat — both as an investor and token creator. This was the Wild West with all the frontier drama & scandal that you’d expect.
Binance — now the world’s largest crypto exchange —was launched during this time. They along with many others (especially from Asia) made it really easy for speculators, traders, and degenerate gamblers to participate in these markets. Similar to other financial markets, the goal was straightforward: buy low and sell high. https://preview.redd.it/tytsu5jnfu951.jpg?width=600&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=fe3425b7e4a71fa953b953f0c7f6eaff6504a0d1 That period left an embarrassing stain on our industry that we’ve still been trying to recover from. It was a period rampant with market manipulation, pump-and-dumps, and scams. To some extent, the crypto industry still suffers from that today, but it’s nothing compared to what it was then.
While the potential of getting filthy rich brought a lot of fly-by-nighters and charlatans into the industry, it also brought a lot of innovators, entrepreneurs, and builders.
The launch and growth of Ethereum has been an incredible technological breakthrough. As with past tech breakthroughs, it has led to a wave of innovation, experimentation, and development. The creativity around tokens, smart contracts, and decentralized applications has been fascinating to witness. Now a few years later, the fruits of those labors are starting to be realized.
I know that for the hardcore crypto people, what we covered today is nothing new. But for those who are still getting up to speed, welcome! I hope this was helpful and that it fuels your interest to learn more. Until you understand the basics of this technology, you won’t be able to fully appreciate the impact that it has on our new digital bank, Genesis Block. You won’t be able to understand the implications, how it relates, or how it helps. After today’s post, some of you probably have a lot more questions. What are specific examples or use-cases of DeFi? Why does it need to be on a blockchain? What benefits does it bring to Genesis Block and our users? In upcoming posts, we answer these questions. Today’s post was just Level 1. It set the foundation for where we’re headed next: even deeper down the crypto rabbit hole. --- Other Ways to Consume Today's Episode:
We have a lot more content coming. Be sure to follow our channels: https://genesisblock.com/follow/ Have you already downloaded the app? We're Genesis Block, a new digital bank that's powered by crypto & decentralized protocols. The app is live in the App Store (iOS & Android). Get the link to download at https://genesisblock.com/download
Spreading Crypto: How Protocols Reach Mainstream Adoption
This is the first post of ourSpreading Cryptoseries where we take a deep dive into what it’ll take to help this technology reach broader adoption. We look at some of the obstacles holding it back and what strategies we think will be successful. Mick Hagen (FoundeCEO) talking about protocols and how they become adopted Like many others working in crypto, I really want to see this tech reach a larger audience. I’ve been drinking crypto kool-aid for awhile now. I bought my first Bitcoin in 2013 and have been working full-time with decentralized protocols since 2014. I’ve been through the peaks of the bull market down to the depths of the bear market. Multiple times. I would not be all-in on this technology if I wasn’t a true believer. I obviously hope that Genesis Block will play an important role. But this goes beyond self-interest. I think for most of us in the industry, increasing crypto adoption is not about money.
It’s not about dumping our bags on retail. But rather it’s about the positive impact we believe this technology can have on the lives and societies all around us.
So, how do we bring this to the masses? How do we rid ourselves of the reputational damage that came with Mt Gox and dark markets like Silk Road? How do we make this technology easier for the normals to use? Today we start answering those questions. ---
Most of the products and services that we all enjoy today use protocols that are under the hood, operating in the background. For example, when you send someone an email you’re using a protocol called SMTP. When you browse the web, you’re using the HTTP protocol. Protocols allow for applications, computers, and devices to interact with each other. They are similar to a spoken language, where they have their own set of rules and vocabulary. If two people share the same language, they can communicate with each other. Protocols are usually hard for the common person to understand because they’re very technical and provide no user interface. There are a few rare cases where the protocols themselves have made it into the cultural lingo, like Bluetooth, WiFi, and SMS. But for the most part, protocols are invisible and hidden from end-users. Other protocols that have reached broad adoption
The world did not embrace the web when the TCP/IP or HTTP protocols were first invented. Nor did they start using email when the POP, SMTP, or IMAP protocols were invented. The masses started browsing the web when AOL and Netscape were launched. They started using email when Hotmail and Gmail went live.
Protocols become adopted when an application makes them more accessible and easier to use.
Protocols become adopted when a strong team abstracts away the complexity, and delivers a compelling product experience that solves a real user pain. This is a pattern that has repeated throughout the history of technology. Other examples include XMPP (chat), VoIP (internet audio calls), WebRTC (video conferencing), and NFC (close-contact device communication). Those protocols weren’t widely adopted until the launch of applications like AIM, WhatsApp, Skype, Google Hangouts, and Apple Pay. Protocols become adopted when the killer application arrives. Screenshots of Netscape and Hotmail
If history is any indication, crypto and blockchain will be no different. Bitcoin is a protocol. Ethereum is a protocol. Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is filled with low-level protocols. What many out there don’t realize — and those within our industry don’t like to acknowledge — is that Crypto today is mostly all protocols.
Decentralized protocols won’t be replacing Robinhood, SoFi, or Venmo anytime soon. They never will. They aren’t meant to!
Crypto protocols are the building blocks, the lego pieces, the primitives that developers can use to build applications on top of. As with the numerous protocols that came before, these innovative protocols need world-class applications. They need product experiences that can propel this exciting tech to the masses. Crypto needs great product teams that abstract away all the blockchain complexity, and deliver it in a way that is simple, convenient, and powerful. Decentralized protocols are like lego pieces
Protocols usually operate in the background. So it should be no surprise that interacting directly with crypto and decentralized protocols is raw, rough, confusing, and complicated for most “normal” people out there. Most of the crypto industry today is still focused on protocol development. That’s totally fine — we’re still at the early stages of this entire industry. But because of that protocol focus, it should be no surprise to any of us that we still haven’t seen mainstream adoption. But as an industry, we cannot forget or lose sight of what it takes to reach the masses. As Mark Twain said, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”
If we want these exciting protocols to be adopted by billions of people around the world, we’re gonna need killer applications. Just like every protocol before.
In our next post, we’ll explore the current state of application development within crypto. Are we getting closer to that killer app? What will it look like? How do we achieve it? Stay tuned, that’s all coming next. --- Other links related to this episode:
Have you already downloaded the app? We're Genesis Block, a new digital bank that's powered by crypto & decentralized protocols. The app is live in the App Store (iOS & Android). Get the link to download at https://genesisblock.com/download We have a lot more content coming. Be sure to follow our channels: https://genesisblock.com/follow/
2019 - On March 14, 2019, the Tokyo District Court found Karpelès guilty of falsifying data to inflate Mt. Gox’s holdings by $33.5 million, for which he was sentenced to 30 months in prison, suspended for four years, meaning he will serve no time unless he commits additional offenses over the next four years.
2019 - In November 2019, Private Internet Access was acquired by Kape Technologies.
In 2017 Knapp sold CyberGhost to an Israeli company called Crossrider for €9.2 million. Crossrider changed its name to “Kape Technologies” in 2018 – for reasons that we’ll explain below. Now here’s where things get interesting. When you research the company Crossrider (now Kape) you learn it is a company known for infecting devices with malware. When you research the company Crossrider, you find numerous articles about Crossrider malware and adware, such as this article from Malwarebytes:
Crossrider offers a highly configurable method for its clients to monetize their software. The common method to infect end-users is software bundlers. The installers usually resort to browser hijacking. Targeted browsers are Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, and sometimes Opera. Crossrider not only targets Windows machines but Macs as well.
PUP.Optional.Crossrider installs are typically triggered by bundlers that offer software you might be interested in and combine them with adware or other monetizing methods. According to Malwarebytes and many other reputable online security websites, Crossrider was hiding malware in software bundlers, which would then infect the user’s computer with “adware or other monetizing methods”.
Trust takes years to build, second to break and Forever to repair.
Why we won't have a long term bear market, and how to systematically pick your future investments in crypto
With so much uncertainty right now it would be a good time to take some time to go over what happened recently and how to invest moving foward. We've seen a peak bubble at around 850 billion total market cap in the first week of January, consolidated down to $750 billion and have now just experienced a 40% correction.
What's happening now and how bad will it get?
First of all you should realize that there is a January Dip that happens every year, when we see a roughly 20-30% decline around mid January. This year its been much more severe though for several additional factors that have compounded on top. Different theories exist on why this happens (its actually the mirror opposite of the "January Effect" that happens in the US stock market), but the two major theories are: 1) Asian markets pull into fiat because of Asian New Year spending needs 2) People in the US sell in January to defer their capital gains tax liability an extra year While this cyclic event has lead to a healthy correction in the last few years, this year we got these new factors making more fear as well:
We had a new breed of speculators come in during the NovembeDecember timeframe after media made cryptocurrency mainstream following the Bitcoin 10K landmark. While cryptocurrency markets have always had too much hype, the latest rise wasn't just over-enthusiasm in fundamentally sound cryptocurrencies like Monero and Ethereum, but mass inflows of fiat into vaporware and complete nonsense without any use case. Many people came in to essentially gamble on symbols on an exchange, and are thus short term oriented and quick to sell on any slight downturn, which such further adds to selling pressure.
So in essence we got a storm of scary news along with the usual cyclic downturn. Currently I don't see this as being a systematic crash like Mt.Gox was that would lead to a long term bear market because the fundamental ecosystem is still intact, and I suspect that after about a month we should consolidate around a new low. All the exchanges are still operational and liquid, and there is no breakdown in trust nor uncertainty whether you'll be able to cash out. What range the market trades in will all depend how Bitcoin does, right now we've already broken below 10K but I'm seeing a lot of support at around $8000, which is roughly where the long term MA curve settles. We don't know how bad it will get or what the future will bring, but as of right now we shouldn't be in a bear market yet. What should you do if you recently entered the market? If you did buy in the last few months at or near ATH, the very worst thing you can do now is sell in panic and lose your principal. You shouldn't have more money in crypto than you can afford to lose, so it shouldn't be a problem to wait. You have to realize that 30% corrections in crypto are relatively common, just last fall we had a 40% flash correction over more China fears. Unless there is a systematic breakdown like we had during Mt.Gox, the market always recovers. The other worst thing you can do is unload into Tether as your safety net. If there is one thing that could actually cause a long term destruction of trust within the cryptocurrency investment ecosystem, its Tether having a run up on their liabilities and not having enough reserve to cover the leverage. It would not only bring down exchanges but lead to years of litigation and endless media headlines that will scare off everybody from putting fiat in. I don't know when the next Mt.Gox meltdown will occur but I can almost guarantee it will involve Tether. So stay away from it. What should long term investors do? For long term holders a good strategy to follow each year is to capture profit each December and swallow the capital gains taxation liability, park a reserve of fiat at Gemini (whose US dollar deposits are FDIC-insured) and simply wait till around late January to early February to re-enter the market at a discount and hold all year until next December. You can keep a small amount in core coins in order to trade around various Q1 opportunities you anticipate. Others may choose to simply do nothing and just keep holding throughout January which is also a perfectly fine strategy. The cyclical correction usually stabilizes toward late January and early February, then we see a rise in March and generally are recovered by end of April. Obviously this decision whether to sell in December to profit on the dip and pay tax liability or to just hold will depend on your individual tax situation. Do your own math sometime in November and follow suit. Essentially revaluate your positions and trim your position sizes if you don't feel comfortable with the losses.
How to construct your portfolio going forward
Rather than seeing the correction as a disaster see it as a time to start fresh. If you have been FOMO-ing into bad cryptos and losing money now is a time to start a systematic long term approach to investing rather than gambling. Follow a methodology for evaluating each cryptocurrency Memes and lambo dreams are fun and all, but I know many of you are investing thousands of dollars into crypto, so its worth it to put some organized thought into it as well. I can't stress enough how important it is to try and logically contruct your investment decisions. If you follow a set methodology, a checklist and template you will be able to do relative comparisons between cryptocurrencies, to force yourself to consider the negatives and alternative scenarios and also sleep comfortably knowing you have a sound basis for your investment decisions (even if they turn out to be wrong). There is no ideal or "correct" methodology but I can outline mine: 1) Initial information gathering and filtering Once I identify something that looks like a good potential investment, I first go to the CoinMarketCap page for that symbol and look at the website and blockchain explorer.
Critically evaluate the website. This is the first pass of the bullshit detector and you can tell from a lot from just the website whether its a scam. If it uses terms like "Web 4.0" or other nonsensical buzzwords, if its unprofessional and has anonymous teams, stay away. Always look for a roadmap, compare to what was actually delivered so far. Always check the team, try to find them on LinkedIn and what they did in the past.
Read the whitepaper or business development plan. You should fully understand how this crypto functions and how its trying to create value. If there is no use case or if the use case does not require or benefit from a blockchain, move on. Look for red flags like massive portions of the float being assigned to the founders of the coin, vague definition of who would use the coin, anonymous teams, promises of large payouts...etc
Check the blockchain explorer. How is the token distribution across accounts? Are the big accounts holding or selling? Which account is likely the foundation account, which is the founders account?
Read the subreddit and blogs for the cryptocurrency and also evaluate the community. Try to figure out exactly what the potential use cases are and look for sceptical takes. Look at the Github repos, does it look empty or is there plenty of activity?
2) Fill out an Investment Checklist I have a checklist of questions that I find important and as I'm researching a crypto I save little snippets in Evernote of things that are relevant to answering those questions:
What is the problem or transactional inefficiency the coin is trying to solve?
What is the Dev Team like? What is their track record? How are they funded, organized?
Who is their competition and how big is the market they're targeting? What is the roadmap they created?
What current product exists?
How does the token/coin actually derive value for the holder? Is there a staking mechanism or is it transactional?
What are the weaknesses or problems with this crypto?
3) Create some sort of consistent valuation model/framework, even if its simple I have a background in finance so I like to do Excel modeling. For those who are interested in that, this article is a great start and also Chris Burniske has a great blog about using Quantity Theory of Money to build an equivalent of a DCF analysis for crypto. Here is an Excel file example of OMG done using his model. You can download this and play around with it yourself, see how the formulas link and understand the logic. Once you have a model set up the way you like in Excel you can simply alter it to account for various float oustanding schedule and market items that are unique to your crypto, and then just start plugging in different assumptions. Think about what is the true derivation of value for the coin, is it a "dividend" coin that you stake within a digital economy and collect fees or is it a currency? Use a realistic monetary velocity (around 5-10 for currency and around 1-2 for staking) and for the discount rate use at least 3x the long term return of a diversified equity fund. The benefit is that this forces you to think about what actually makes this coin valuable to an actual user within the digital economy its participating in and force you to think about the assumptions you are making about the future. Do your assumptions make sense? What would the assumptions have to be to justify its current price? You can create different scenarios in a matrix (optimistic vs. pessimistic) based on different assumptions for risk (discount rate) and implementation (adoption rates). If you don't understand the above thats perfectly fine, you don't need to get into full modeling or have a financial background. Even a simple model that just tries to derive a valuation through relative terms will put you above most crypto investors. Some simple valuation methods that anyone can do
Metcalfe's Law which states that the value of a network is proportional to the square of the number of connected users of the system (n2). So you can compare various currencies based on their market cap and square of active users or traffic.
Another easy one is simply looking at the total market for the industry that the coin is supposedly targeting and comparing it to the market cap of the coin. Think of the market cap not only with circulating supply like its shown on CMC but including total supply. For example the total supply for Dentacoin is 1,841,395,638,392, and when multiplied by its price in early January we get a market cap that is actually higher than the entire industry it aims to disrupt: Dentistry.
If its meant to be just used as just a currency: Take a look at the circulating supply and look at the amount that is in cold storage or set to be released/burned. Most cryptos are deflationary so think about how the float schedule will change over time and how this will affect price.
Once you have a model you like set up, you can compare cryptos against each other and most importantly it will require that you build a mental framework within your own mind on why somebody would want to own this coin other than to sell it to another greater fool for a higher price. Modeling out a valuation will lead you to think long term and think about the inherent value, rather than price action. Once you go through this 3-step methodology, you'll have a pretty good confidence level for making your decision and can comfortably sit back and not panic if some temporary short term condition leads to a price decrease. This is how "smart money" does it. Think about your portfolio allocation You should think first in broad terms how you allocate between "safe" and "speculative" cryptos. For new investors its best to keep a substantial portion in what would be considered largecap safe cryptos, primarily BTC, ETH, LTC. I personally consider XMR to be safe as well. A good starting point is to have between 50-70% of your portfolio in these safe cryptocurrencies. As you become more confident and informed you can move your allocation into speculative small caps. You should also think in terms of segments and how much of your total portfolio is in each segment:
You should also think about where we are in the cycle, as now given so much uncertaintly its probably best to stay heavily in core holdings and pick up a few coins within a segment you understand well. If you don't understand how enterprise solutions work or how the value chain is built through corporations, don't invest in the enteprise blockchain solutions segment. If you are a technie who loves the technology behind Cardano or IOTA, invest in that segment. Think of your "circle of competence" This is actually a term Buffet came up with, it refers to your body of knowledge that allows you to evaluate an investment. Think about what you know best and consider investing in those type of coins. If you don't know anything about how supply chains functions, how can you competently judge whether VeChain or WaltonChain will achieve adoption? This where your portfolio allocation also comes into play. You should diversify but really shouldn't be in much more than around 12 cryptos, because you simply don't have enough competency to accurately access the risk across every segment and for every type of crypto you come across. If you had over 20 different cryptos in your portfolio you should probably think about consolidating to a few sectors you understand well. Continually educate yourself about the technology and markets If you aren't already doing it: Read a bit each day about cryptocurrencies. There are decent Youtubers that talk about the market side of crypto, just avoid those that hype specific coins and look for more sceptical ones like CryptoInvestor. If you don't understand how the technology works and what the benefits of a blockchain are or how POS/POW works or what a DAG is or how mining actually works, learn first. If you don't care about the technology or find reading about it tedious, you shouldn't invest in this space at all.
Summing it up
I predicted a few days ago that we would have a major correction in 2018 specifically in the altcoins that saw massive gains in Decemebeearly January, and it seems we've already had a pretty big one. I don't think we'll have a complete meltdown like some are predicting, but some more pain may be incoming. Basically take this time to think about how you can improve your investment style and strategy. Make a commitment to value things rather than chasing FOMO, and take your time to make a decision. Long term investment will grant you much more returns as will a systematic approach. Take care and have fun investing :) Edit March 2018: Lol looking back I'm regretting starting the title with "Why we won't have a long term bear market" now, I was more karma whoring with that catchy title than anything. We recovered up to 11K from this post, but then crashed again hard later in February-March because of a slew of reasons from Tether subpeona to unforseen regulatory issues.
Technical: The `SIGHASH_NOINPUT` Debate! Chaperones and output tagging and signature replay oh my!
Bitcoin price isn't moving oh no!!! You know WHAT ELSE isn't moving?? SIGHASH_NOINPUT that's what!!! Now as you should already know, Decker-Russell-Osuntokun ("eltoo") just ain't possible without SIGHASH_NOINPUT of some kind or other. And Decker-Russell-Osuntokun removes the toxic waste problem (i.e. old backups of your Poon-Dryja LN channels are actively dangerous and could lose your funds if you recover from them, or worse, your most hated enemy could acquire copies of your old state and make you lose funds). Decker-Russell-Osuntokun also allows multiparticipant offchain cryptocurrency update systems, without the drawback of a large unilateral close timeout that Decker-Wattenhofer does, making this construction better for use at the channel factory layer. Now cdecker already wrote a some code implementing SIGHASH_NOINPUT before, which would make it work in current pre-SegWit P2PKH, P2SH, as well as SegWit v0 P2WPKH and P2WSH. He also made and published BIP 118. But as is usual for Bitcoin Core development, this triggered debate, and thus many counterproposals were made and so on. Suffice it to say that the simple BIP 118 looks like it won't be coming into Bitcoin Core anytime soon (or possibly at all). First things first: This link contains all that you need to know, but hey, maybe you'll find my take more amusing. So let's start with the main issue.
Signature Replay Attack
SIGHASH_NOINPUT basically means "I am authorizing the spend of any coin of this particular value protected by my key, to be spent to these addresses".
Of note is that the default SIGHASH_ALL means "I am authorizing the spend of this particular coin of this particular value protected by my key, to be spent to these addresses".
So suppose you were to engage in address reuse. This is highly discouraged behavior, but people are people, people are lazy, and etc. etc. In practice it happens.
Now suppose you had two deposits of equal size, in the same address that you have been reusing.
Now further suppose that for some reason, your wallet signs using SIGHASH_NOINPUT only. luke-jr has even promised to write one when SIGHASH_NOINPUT is implemented, so you don't even need to go search for one, you just pester luke-jr to release it.
So you got two UTXOs, of equal value, to the same address.
You spend one UTXO, signing with SIGHASH_NOINPUT, to pay almkglor because he's so awesome at explaining Bitcoin things and deserves to be paid for it.
almkglor realizes you've used SIGHASH_NOINPUTand that you engaged in address reuse. He writes a new transaction spending your other UTXO of same value and same address, reusing the same signature ("Signature Replay") that was publicly attached to your previous tx. The signature authorizes the spend of any coin protected by that key.
Since luke-jr is strongly against address reuse, he will just LOL at you for doing address reuse with his wallet software and mark your bugreports with wontfix, gendopose, allaccordingtothescenario.
The above is the Signature Replay Attack, and the reason why SIGHASH_NOINPUT has triggered debate as to whether it is safe at all and whether we can add enough stuff to it to ever make it safe. Now of course you could point to SIGHASH_NONE which is even worse because all it does is say "I am authorizing the spend of this particular coin of this particular value protected by my key" without any further restrictions like which outputs it goes to. But then SIGHASH_NONE is intended to be used to sacrifice your money to the miners, for example if it's a dust attack trying to get you to spend, so you broadcast a SIGHASH_NONE signature and some enterprising miner will go get a bunch of such SIGHASH_NONE signatures and gather up the dust in a transaction that pays to nobody and gets all the funds as fees. And besides; even if we already have something you could do stupid things with, it's not a justification for adding more things you could do stupid things with. So yes, SIGHASH_NOINPUT makes Bitcoin more powerful. Now, Bitcoin is a strong believer in "Principle of Least Power". So adding more power to Bitcoin via SIGHASH_NOINPUT is a violation of Principle of Least Power, at least to those arguing to add even more limits to SIGHASH_NOINPUT. I believe nullc is one of those who strongly urges for adding more limits to SIGHASH_NOINPUT, because it distracts him from taking pictures of his autonomous non-human neighbor, a rather handsome gray fox, but also because it could be used as the excuse for the next MtGox, where a large exchange inadvertently pays to SIGHASH_NOINPUT-using addresses and becomes liable/loses track of their funds when signature replay happens.
Making SIGHASH_NOINPUT safer by not allowing normal addresses use it. Basically, we have 32 different SegWit versions. The current SegWit addresses are v0, the next version (v1) is likely to be the Schnorr+Taproot+MAST thing. What output tagging proposes is to limit SegWit version ranges from 0->15 in the bech32 address scheme (instead of 0->31 it currently has). Versions 16 to 31 are then not valid bech32 SegWit addresses and exchanges shouldn't pay to it. Then, we allow the use of SIGHASH_NOINPUT only for version 16. Version 16 might very well be Schnorr+Taproot+MAST, with a side serving of SIGHASH_NOINPUT. This is basically output tagging. SIGHASH_NOINPUT can only be used if the output is tagged (by paying to version 16 SegWit) to allow it, and addresses do not allow outputs to be tagged as such, removing the potential liability of large custodial services like exchanges. Now, Decker-Russell-Osuntokun channels have two options:
Make the funding txo pay to a version 16 SegWit.
Make the funding txo pay to a version 0/1 SegWit.
The tradeoffs in this case are:
If the funding txo pays to a version 16 SegWit, then anyone analyzing the blockchain can point at a version 16 SegWit txo and conclude it was used for the Lightning Network, because seriously, there's little other use for SIGHASH_NOINPUT other than that (well there's certain limited kinds of vault-like constructions, but for the most part, the balance of probability will be that it's a LN channel).
Of note is that even non-published channels will likely be trackable via the funding txo paying to version 16 SegWit, which is published onchain.
Also, current already-closed published Poon-Dryja channels, that are closed by mutual close instead of unilateral, are indistinguishable onchain from ordinary spends. Trackers that want to keep track of Lightning usage need to store the information themselves, about such published channels that have been closed; the LN won't store it for them, so that at least moves the burden of storing that information to the surveillors, and fuck them anyway.
If the funding txo pays to a version 0/1 SegWit, then in the unilateral case we need to have an additional transaction that takes the funding txo and pays to a version 16 SegWit. This adds more overhead in the unilateral close case, and unilateral close in Decker-Russell-Osuntokun already needs two txes (an update and settlement tx); this adds one more tx, a "converter" from version 0/1 SegWit to version 16 SegWit.
This lets mutual closes indistinguishable from ordinary spends onchain. Unilateral closes are still obvious, but even today in the Poon-Dryja world unilateral closes are plenty darn obvious (very specific SCRIPT templates are used).
The latter tradeoff is probably what would be taken (because we're willing to pay for privacy) if Bitcoin Core decides in favor of tagged outputs. Another issue here is --- oops, P2SH-Segwit wrapped addresses. P2SH can be used to wrap any SegWit payment script, including payments to any SegWit version, including v16. So now you can sneak in a SIGHASH_NOINPUT-enabled SegWit v16 inside an ordinary P2SH that wraps a SegWit payment. One easy way to close this is just to disallow P2SH-SegWit from being valid if it's spending to SegWit version >= 16.
Closing the Signature Replay Attack by adding a chaperone. Now we can observe that the Signature Replay Attack is possible because only one signature is needed, and that signature allows any coin of appropriate value to be spent. Adding a chaperone signature simply means requiring that the SCRIPT involved have at least two OP_CHECKSIG operations. If one signature is SIGHASH_NOINPUT, then at least one other signature (the chaperone) validated by the SCRIPT should be SIGHASH_ALL. This is not so onerous for Decker-Russell-Osuntokun. Both sides can use a MuSig of their keys, to be used for the SIGHASH_NOINPUT signature (so requires both of them to agree on a particular update), then use a shared ECDH key, to be used for the SIGHASH_ALL signature (allows either of them to publish the unilateral close once the update has been agreed upon). Of course, the simplest thing to do would be for a BOLT spec to say "just use this spec-defined private key k so we can sidestep the Chaperone Signatures thing". That removes the need to coordinate to define a shared ECDH key during channel establishment: just use the spec-indicated key, which is shared to all LN implementations. But now look at what we've done! We've subverted the supposed solution of Chaperone Signatures, making them effectively not there, because it's just much easier for everyone to use a standard private key for the chaperone signature than to derive a separate new keypair for the Chaperone. So chaperone signatures aren't much better than just doing SIGHASH_NOINPUT by itself, and you might as well just use SIGHASH_NOINPUT without adding chaperones. I believe ajtowns is the primary proponent of this proposal.
Toys for the Big Boys
The Signature Replay Attack is Not A Problem (TM). This position is most strongly held by RustyReddit I believe (he's the Rusty Russell in the Decker-Russell-Osuntokun). As I understand it, he is more willing to not see SIGHASH_NOINPUT enabled, than to have it enabled but with restrictions like Output Tagging or Chaperone Signatures. Basically, the idea is: don't use SIGHASH_NOINPUT for normal wallets, in much the same way you don't use SIGHASH_NONE for normal wallets. If you want to do address reuse, don't use wallet software made by luke-jr that specifically screws with your ability to do address reuse. SIGHASH_NOINPUT is a flag for use by responsible, mutually-consenting adults who want to settle down some satoshis and form a channel together. It is not something that immature youngsters should be playing around with, not until they find a channel counterparty that will treat this responsibility properly. And if those immature youngsters playing with their SIGHASH_NOINPUT flags get into trouble and, you know, lose their funds (as fooling around with SIGHASH_NOINPUT is wont to do), well, they need counseling and advice ("not your keys not your coins", "hodl", "SIGHASH_NOINPUT is not a toy, but something special, reserved for those willing to take on the responsibility of making channels according to the words of Decker-Russell-Osuntokun"...).
Dunno yet. It's still being debated! So yeah. SIGHASH_NOINPUT isn't moving, just like Bitcoin's price!!! YAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA.
February — The first ever cryptocurrency exchange, Bitcoin Market, is established. The first trade takes place a month later. April — The first public bitcoin trade takes place: 1000BTC traded for $30 at an exchange rate of 0.03USD/1BTC May — The first real-world bitcoin transaction is undertaken by Laszlo Hanyecz, who paid 10000BTC for two Papa John’s pizzas (Approximately $25 USD) June — Bitcoin developer Gavin Andreson creates a faucet offering 5 free BTC to the public July — First notable usage of the word “blockchain” appears on BitcoinTalk forum. Prior to this, it was referred to as ‘Proof-of-Work chain’ July — Bitcoin exchange named Magic The Gathering Online eXchange—also known as Mt. Gox—established August —Bitcoin protocol bug leads to emergency hard fork December — Satoshi Nakamoto ceases communication with the world
January — One-quarter of the eventual total of 21M bitcoins have been generated February — Bitcoin reaches parity for the first time with USD April — Bitcoin reaches parity with EUR and GBP June — WikiLeaks begins accepting Bitcoin donations June — Mt. Gox hacked, resulting in suspension of trading and a precipitous price drop for Bitcoin August — First Bitcoin Improvement Proposal: BIP Purpose and Guidelines October — Litecoin released December — Bitcoin featured as a major plot element in an episode of ‘The Good Wife’ as 9.45 million viewers watch.
May — Bitcoin Magazine, founded by Mihai Alisie and Vitalik Buterin, publishes first issue July — Government of Estonia begins incorporating blockchain into digital ID efforts September — Bitcoin Foundation created October — BitPay reports having over 1,000 merchants accepting bitcoin under its payment processing service November — First Bitcoin halving to 25 BTC per block
February — Reddit begins accepting bitcoins for Gold memberships March — Cyprus government bailout levies bank accounts with over $100k. Flight to Bitcoin results in major price spike. May —Total Bitcoin value surpasses 1 billion USD with 11M Bitcoin in circulation May — The first cryptocurrency market rally and crash takes place. Prices rise from $13 to $220, and then drop to $70 June — First major cryptocurrency theft. 25,000 BTC is stolen from Bitcoin forum founder July — Mastercoin becomes the first project to conduct an ICO August — U.S. Federal Court issues opinion that Bitcoin is a currency or form of money October — The FBI shuts down dark web marketplace Silk Road, confiscating approximately 26,000 bitcoins November — Vitalik Buterin releases the Ethereum White Paper: “A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform” December — The first commit to the Ethereum codebase takes place
January — Vitalik Buterin announces Ethereum at the North American Bitcoin Conference in Miami February — HMRC in the UK classifies Bitcoin as private money March — Newsweek claims Dorian Nakamoto is Bitcoin creator. He is not April — Gavin Wood releases the Ethereum Yellow Paper: “Ethereum: A Secure Decentralised Generalised Transaction Ledger” June — Ethereum Foundation established in Zug, Switzerland June — US Marshals Service auctions off 30,000 Bitcoin confiscated from Silk Road. All are purchased by venture capitalist Tim Draper July — Ethereum token launch raises 31,591 BTC ($18,439,086) over 42 days September — TeraExchange launches first U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission approved Bitcoin over-the-counter swap October — ConsenSys is founded by Joe Lubin December — By year’s end, Paypal, Zynga, u/, Expedia, Newegg, Dell, Dish Network, and Microsoft are all accepting Bitcoin for payments
January — Coinbase opens up the first U.S-based cryptocurrency exchange February — Stripe initiates bitcoin payment integration for merchants April — NASDAQ initiates blockchain trial June — NYDFS releases final version of its BitLicense virtual currency regulations July — Ethereum’s first live mainnet release—Frontier—launched. August — Augur, the first token launch on the Ethereum network takes place September — R3 consortium formed with nine financial institutions, increases to over 40 members within six months October — Gemini exchange launches, founded by Tyler and Cameron Winklevoss November — Announcement of first zero knowledge proof, ZK-Snarks December — Linux Foundation establishes Hyperledger project
January — Zcash announced February — HyperLedger project announced by Linux Foundation with thirty founding members March — Second Ethereum mainnet release, Homestead, is rolled out. April — The DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) launches a 28-day crowdsale. After one month, it raises an Ether value of more than US$150M May — Chinese Financial Blockchain Shenzhen Consortium launches with 31 members June — The DAO is attacked with 3.6M of the 11.5M Ether in The DAO redirected to the attacker’s Ethereum account July — The DAO attack results in a hard fork of the Ethereum Blockchain to recover funds. A minority group rejecting the hard fork continues to use the original blockchain renamed Ethereum Classic July — Second Bitcoin halving to 12.5BTC per block mined November — CME Launches Bitcoin Price Index
January — Bitcoin price breaks US$1,000 for the first time in three years February — Enterprise Ethereum Alliance formed with 30 founding members, over 150 members six months later March — Multiple applications for Bitcoin ETFs rejected by the SEC April — Bitcoin is officially recognized as currency by Japan June — EOS begins its year-long ICO, eventually raising $4 billion July — Parity hack exposes weaknesses in multisig wallets August — Bitcoin Cash forks from the Bitcoin Network October — Ethereum releases Byzantium soft fork network upgrade, part one of Metropolis September — China bans ICOs October — Bitcoin price surpasses $5,000 USD for the first time November — Bitcoin price surpasses $10,000 USD for the first time December — Ethereum Dapp Cryptokitties goes viral, pushing the Ethereum network to its limits
January — Ethereum price peaks near $1400 USD March — Google bans all ads pertaining to cryptocurrency March — Twitter bans all ads pertaining to cryptocurrency April — 2018 outpaces 2017 with $6.3 billion raised in token launches in the first four months of the year April — EU government commits $300 million to developing blockchain projects June — The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission states that Ether is not a security. July — Over 100,000 ERC20 tokens created August — New York Stock Exchange owner announces Bakkt, a federally regulated digital asset exchange October — Bitcoin’s 10th birthday November — VC investment in blockchain tech surpasses $1 billion December — 90% of banks in the US and Europe report exploration of blockchain tech
January — Coinstar machines begin selling cryptocurrency at grocery stores across the US February — Ethereum’s Constantinople hard fork is released, part two of Metropolis April — Bitcoin surpasses 400 million total transactions June — Facebook announces Libra July — United States senate holds hearings titled ‘Examining Regulatory Frameworks for Digital Currencies and Blockchain” August — Ethereum developer dominance reaches 4x that of any other blockchain October — Over 80 million distinct Ethereum addresses have been created September — Santander bank settles both sides of a $20 million bond on Ethereum November — Over 3000 Dapps created. Of them, 2700 are built on Ethereum
As a technological advocate I am not against Bitcoin and cryptocurrency technologies. I don't happen to believe it will ever replace traditional currencies (and by that I include gold and silver), although it might find a way to mesh with traditional currencies, a form of secure payment authorization method. That being said, I have a limited understanding of how bitcoin operates under the hood. However, I do have a background in computer science, so it's not voodoo to me. From what I understand, this mighty "blockchain" contains every transaction from any wallet to any other wallet, since day one. This includes the biggest $100 million dollar transfers all the way down to somebody losing 2 cents on a wager at a bitcoin gambling site. It seems to be that this is a serious flaw in the scalability of Bitcoin. This blockchain is growing larger at an exponential pace (or at least it's intended to, if bitcoin should become exponentially accepted as a currency system.) If you extrapolate this to reach the wildest dreams of bitcoin enthusiasts, every single transaction should be recorded on the blockchain. And some people will have to maintain that mountain of data in order to participate in the blockchain network. Currently, I believe the size of the blockchain is a trifling 10-20 gigabytes, so it's not a problem. But what would happen if we really did try using it as currency? What if all of the charges that go through Visa or MasterCard were suddenly handled by bitcoin? How big would the blockchain grow then? I read one estimate that at current Bitcoin rates, Visa alone would expand the blockchain by 70-80 terabytes per month. Going by Moore's Law, by the time that happens we might all have 100 terabyte hard drives, but it's still an awfully large file to cope with. And it won't get smaller. Ever. To make matters worse, there's nothing to stop hackers and those with idle time to make frivolous transfers back and forth between wallets, either to create some deception (e.g. make it look like a business is conducting brisk business), or just "for the lulz." Either way, the blockchain gets even more bloated. And what if the bitcoiner's ultimate dream comes true: that the entire world abandons traditional currencies and is united under the bitcoin flag? Then I imagine an inconceivable number of transactions taking place, petabytes a minute. So much data that only an organization like the NSA could cope with it. Suddenly one of the main advantages of bitcoin—that it's decentralized and in the hands of the general population—becomes completely negated. Suddenly, the 50% attack becomes feasible. I'm not saying that this is the magic bullet that negates bitcoin, but it's a serious concern of mine from a technological perspective. I could be wrong, and if I am, please clear up my misunderstandings. I wish I could discuss this on /bitcoin but the conversation there is, well, let's say it's far less than professional. (EDIT: typos)
Bitcoin (BTC) Has Seen One Major Rally During Each Block Reward Era
https://preview.redd.it/lf7p0zqyn5d21.png?width=600&format=png&auto=webp&s=09a9c48586f96f1dda44b4a1af2d69b8bf57aa4f https://cryptoiq.co/bitcoin-btc-has-seen-one-major-rally-during-each-block-reward-era/ So far, there have been 3 block reward eras for Bitcoin (BTC). The first era started with the genesis block in early January 2009, and there were 50 Bitcoin per block. The second era began at block 210,000 in late November 2012, and the block reward halved to 25 Bitcoin. The third era, which we are in as of this writing, began at block 420,000 in early July 2016. The block reward is now 12.5 Bitcoin. When we overlay block reward halving dates on a logarithmic chart of Bitcoin’s price (below), it becomes apparent that there has been one major rally during each block reward era, at least so far. Further, roughly a year before the block halving that begins the era, the major rally of that era begins. Source: @MoonOverlord on Twitter As can be seen in the above chart the Bitcoin rally of late 2013 which brought Bitcoin over $1,000 for the first time occurred towards the middle of the 2nd era, and the rally to $20,000 in late 2017 occurred near the middle of the third era. The fourth block reward era, when block rewards will be slashed to 6.25 Bitcoin, will start at block 630,000, projected to occur in May 2020. If the trend in the above chart continues, Bitcoin would bottom in late Spring or early Summer 2019 and then rally for one to two years to new all-time highs. There may be some causation to this correlation. We expect that block halvings would help increase Bitcoin’s price since the rate of creation from mining is slashed. That means the Bitcoin inflation rate is halved. In the presence of increasing demand, the halving of the inflow of new Bitcoin would increase its price. That said, there are many other factors that influence Bitcoin’s market cycles, making it perhaps overly simplistic to say that Bitcoin’s past two market cycles have been entirely due to the block halving. This correlation could be a coincidence. It’s worth noting, however, that the rally of late 2013 ended as Mt. Gox collapsed, and the rally of 2017 ended as CME Bitcoin futures were launched and introduced massive short selling pressure. Nonetheless, traders and investors pricing in the next block halving may apply upward pressure on Bitcoin’s price when May 2020 approaches. It will be interesting to see if history repeats itself and Bitcoin sees new all-time highs during the fourth block reward era.
The Monetary Sovereignty War-cry: Proof of Keys - [Jan/3➞₿🔑∎]
TO All Soldiers for Monetary Sovereignty: Every January 3rd the Bitcoin community participates in a Proof of Keys celebration by demanding and taking possession of all bitcoins and other cryptocurrency held by trusted third parties on their behalf. You can do this by withdrawing all Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency to wallets where you hold the private keys and perform network consensus for validation. On 9 Dec 2018 Trace Mayer introduced the annual Proof of Keys celebration. This cultural tradition enables you, the individual, to prove your monetary sovereignty and strengthen the Bitcoin network by using a full-node for an economically substantive transaction(s). Together, on this day, all of us get to celebrate our monetary independence from trusted third parties (which are security holes!). And we strengthen the decentralization of the Bitcoin network in the process! This is a way for you to invest in yourself. There are a lot of people who want to keep you weak, dependent and enervated when it comes to your monetary sovereignty. You must take the personal responsibility and summon the desire to take action to declare your monetary independence and prove to yourself that you, and no-one else, hold the private keys to your own money. There has been much discussion on Reddit, Twitter and Youtube for those who need help with how to do this safely and securely. And those who were trained this year can become teachers next year. Even though we may be ensconced in our cold storage; we must never forget the new user and leave them behind and stranded on the battlefield of control over their money. Some helpful interviews about Proof of Keys include Crypt0 News, Crypto Cast Network, Let's Talk Bitcoin - With Andreas Antonopolous and What Bitcoin Did. Some helpful discussion includes storing bitcoins , Bitcoin's Security Model and Bitcoin Miners and Invalid Blocks. Perhaps most important is how this tradition helps educate, teach and train new users of Bitcoin. The effect on yourself is much more important than that on third parties or the Bitcoin network. Hopefully, everything will go smoothly and there will be no losses of funds, no shady behaviors or delays by exchanges or other third-parties and no significant Bitcoin network congestion. But even if there is, those are very minor costs to pay in the battle for monetary sovereignty. And if you already keep your bitcoins safely in cold storage and still want to join the community and participate then consider skipping a meal and instead buying $20+ worth of bitcoins and moving them into cold storage. Take more scarce territory on the Bitcoin blockchain! After all, having Proof of Keys is much better than 'Proof of Roger', MtGox, Silk Road), Bitfinex, Bitstamp, or some other possibly untrustworthy third party! There have even been some articles about third parties halting withdrawals in preparation like HitBTC. This video of Roger Ver was recorded on July 14, 2013 at the MTGOX headquarters. MtGox declared bankruptcy Feb 2014 announcing 850,000 bitcoins belonging to customers were missing. In conclusion, this magic Internet money thing is about a lot more than just making money. The battle over our monetary sovereignty is now a personal fight by each of us. We have rallied around the banner of Bitcoin because (1) it is the soundest and hardest money that is strictly limited in amount that the world has ever known and (2) it is a censorship-resistant decentralized network. But to maintain those properties requires eternal vigilance and protection by those who yearn for those protections. Thus, this battle over monetary sovereignty has only two possible outcomes: either (1) control of their own lives by the people themselves the world over or (2) control of the people and their lives by political and economic elitists. So, fellow soldiers on the battlefield of monetary sovereignty, every January Third join me in a Proof of Keys! Sincerely, Trace Mayer
setup an account on coinbase.com, buy your coins, walk away until next year or later, fees are ~1.5% which is $1.5 USD for a $100 USD of coin
note coinbase does have an option to buy via credit card instead of a bank account, fees are ~4% when you do that, your credit card company may charge more if it considers it a cash transfer
Guide for Not Noobs
-setup an account on coinbase.com, move dollars into your account, setup an account on gdax.com (same company, same login), move your cash from coinbase to gdax, buy your coins on GDAX at Market, fees are cheaper 0.25% versus 1.5% -consider buying alternative coins supported by coinbase
-all of the above but use GDAX's Limit/Buy, zero fees, but you have to wait for the market to dip below your buy price
More Money Available
-setup several Limit/Buy orders at different price points to capture dips when you are away
More Control but More Complex
-it's possible coinbase could go out of business, move some or most of your coins to a personal hardware wallet like a Trezor or Ledger Nano S, made in Czech Republic and France respectively -consider using other exchanges with different fees and coin support -consider buying other alternative coins supported by other exchanges
You Are Very Responsible
-create a paper wallet, put it in a safe, be warned it's like a visual bearer instrument, if you lose it or someone takes a picture of it...it's gone, but you have complete control over your money/asset
DO NOT EVER
-buy more than you can lose, it's early wild west days, the market could easily come crashing down -panic sell, the market fluctuates regularly by 20%, thus far it has ALWAYS recovered, people that try to sell during a fall/dip and buy at the bottom usually miss time it and lose -store your keys on your computer or phone unless its small amount, these are the two most vulnerable routes to hacking and simple hardware failure resulting in loss -attempt to daytrade and time the best prices unless your real life job is day trading -get addicted to watching the market, pay attention watch for dips, but don't let it crowd out your work or free time -keep a LOT of cash or coin in an exchange, it is very easy to mistype and buy or sell far more than you meant to, exchanges can disappear with your coins -buy a hardware wallet from anyone other than the company who makes it, i.e. do not buy one on Amazon, it is possible some third person hacked it and could steal your coin
-limit sells until the far future when market volatility is down, flash crashes have happened and recovered, if you had all your coin in limit sells it would be gone -margin trade unless your real life job is day trading -stop buys or stop sells unless your real life job is day trading
-hold your coins, your coin may be worth x10 or more in value in the future, e.g. if bitcoin replaced gold, bitcoin would be worth ~x70 the current value -buy small amounts over time DCA, this might not seem intuitive but it spreads your risk out, reduces risk of buying at all time highs (ATH) and more likely to catch lows (dips), a fluctuation of $100 in price is small if the eventual value is worth x10 or more in the future -keep a small amount of cash on an exchange always, when there is a lot of traffic/trading which happens during dips, you are much more likely to be able to make trades on an exchange rather than with your own wallet
-if you don't have your coin in your own wallet, it's not your coin. this is not a problem until you have a lot of value and you want to keep it safe from a bankruptcy, unscrupulous people/exchanges, or unforeseen acts. if it's a small amount compared to your income it's an acceptable risk, if not then move it to a wallet -in the days of fake news not everything you read is true, in fact there are armies of people shilling for 'pick a random coin'; some are malicious, some uninformed, and some willfully uninformed -if your value starts to become large, dig deep into how your asset/currencies work just like you would for any other purchase, understanding how it works helps you understand if it will be a success, e.g. understand the difference between PoW vs PoS or what a hard fork is -some coins especially newer ones are scams, a good indication of if it is not a scam is how long the coin has been around -most bitcoin hard forks so far have not been successful with some exceptions -btc is the accepted short-name for bitcoin on most (but not all) exchanges, xbt is also common in EUR-land
-holding your own coin requires personal responsibility, it is easy to lose and not be able to recover it if you are not careful -again, do not buy more coin than you can lose -transaction speeds which are slow are a serious problem in bitcoin scaling -there is less innovation and more argument going on in bitcoin than some other coins, bitcoin is large enough that consensus is difficult, future change is less likely than with some other coins, there are other side solutions to bitcoins problems that may not require bitcoin to change much -bitcoin.org IS the generally accepted bitcoin website, NOT bitcoin.com -important other risks compiled by themetalfriend -coinbase has insurance up to $250k USD for you USD Wallet which DOES NOT cover your bitcoins or other crypto currencies, they claim to have separate insurance for your crypto currency but it is unclear how much
there are a lot of memes -hodl, GameKyuubi mistyped hold and it spread -to the moon, where everyone hopes the price will go -coin on a rollercoaster, it is highly volitile market you will see this during fluctuations -this is gentlemen, via Liquid_child , here -lambo/roadster, a car people want to buy when they get rich -the cost of pizza, early days someone bought a pizza for 10,000btc which is worth over ~80million USD today -tesla/vehicle with a bitcoin chart, cytranic posted a picture that spread -intersting guide by stos313 , here. I do not agree with everything but it has a lot of useful information.
Edit: Adding in user comments. Edit: Crosslinking to a more Beginner Version. Edit: Note in an earlier edit of this guide I said. note that most of the development on bitcoin is by employees of one company, it is open source but their priorities may not align with the community This is not true. Blockstream appears to have a high representation but not an overwhelming amount. You can compare blockstream's employee page and bitcoin's commits in the last year. Thank you to lclc_ , trilli0nn , and Holographiks for pointing this out. See this for a detailed break down. Edit: Clarification that FDIC insurance does NOT cover crypto currency/assets. Edit: Clarity on who owns bitcoin.org
Good Luck and Hodl.
Please comment if your experience is different. Or call out things I missed.
Mt. Gox, called "Mount Gox" or simply "Gox", was the most widely used bitcoin currency exchange market from shortly after its inception in 2010 to its insolvency late 2013. The market was closed February 25, 2014 and has since filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan and the United States, after losing 640 thousand bitcoins. Februar suspendierte die Mt.Gox Börse alle Auszahlungstransaktionen aufgrund des Verdachts eines Massenangriffs durch ... ehemals führender Entwickler von BitGo, zeigte auf der Konferenz Building on Bitcoin, dass rund 4 Millionen Bitcoins für immer verloren waren und weitere 2 Millionen gestohlen wurden. Somit sind bis Juli 2018 insgesamt 6 Millionen BTC nicht verfügbar. Um sie wieder ... Mt Gox Bitcoins: Trustee Plans to Distribute BTC and BCH, Liquidate Forks Into Cash . On March 24, the Mt Gox creditors’ trustee from Tokyo, Nobuaki Kobayashi, disclosed a newly written ... Mt. Gox issued a press release on 10 February stating that withdrawals were completely halted due to transaction malleability: “A bug in the bitcoin software makes it possible for someone to use the Bitcoin network to alter transaction details to make it seem like a sending of bitcoins to a bitcoin wallet did not occur when in fact it did occur. Since the transaction appears as if it has not ... Mt. Gox, called "Mount Gox" or simply "Gox", was the most widely used bitcoin currency exchange market from shortly after its inception in 2010 to its insolvency late 2013. The market was closed February 25, 2014 and has since filed for bankruptcy protection in Japan and the United States, after losing 640 thousand bitcoins.. A registrant on Mt. Gox had at least two sub-accounts: one for ...
MT.Gox failliet. De Bitcoin Exchange is door een veiligheidslek gehackt en 350 miljoen aan Bitcoins kwijt. This video is unavailable. Watch Queue Queue. Watch Queue Queue 3. Transferring 23.23 USD from MtGox to BTC-e via Bitinstant (1.49% fee). 4. Receiving 22.89 USD on BTC-e Bitcoin exchange. 5. Buying new Bitcoins for a price of 11.40 USD/BTC getting 2.0037 BTC ... MtGox Bitcoins to BTC Bitcoins in 50 seconds BITCOIN PRICE , BITCOIN FUTURE in doubt http://youtu.be/eO-yrpQpIT8 What is NAMECOIN BITCOIN'S First Fork http:/... in this video Jason will show you how to get your money into mt.gox